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                                                             Abstract 
The genocide in Darfur, Sudan has left over 300,000 dead, thus bringing the death toll in the entire 
Sudanese conflicts from 1956 to almost 2 million people and the number of displaced persons to 
over 2 million. The exacerbation of the crisis is traceable to government’s complicity exemplified by 
its standing order to the United Nations to stay off and evacuate its monitors in what it considered 
an entirely Sudanese affair that could be resolved without external interference. However, 
considering the limits of state sovereignty in a modern international system, where membership of 
the UN, the existence of the Geneva Convention on the Laws of War, Humanitarian Law and other 
subsisting legal frameworks on war crimes erode absolute sovereignty, the Sudanese government 
cannot hide under the non-interference in the internal affairs of states clause to prevent the 
international community from intervention in Darfur. This probably explains the recent approval by 
the Government of Sudan to finally allow a joint UN-AU troops to restore security, bowing to 
intense international pressure to do so. 
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Introduction: Evolution of the Concept of State Sovereignty 
In discussing the evolution or emergence of the concept of state sovereignty, the 
centrality of the impact of the Peace of Westphalia of October 1648; and the idea of 
global citizenship, which found expression in the thought of the Stoics of the Hellenic 
Age and Cicero in Medieval Rome, and which has dominated recent political movement, 
must be taken into account. In the case of the Peace of Westphalia, it must be stated that 
the ideas emerging from the Protestant Reformation in the 17th century characterised the 
social environment that facilitated the transfer of authority from the Holy Roman Empire 
to sovereign states. Deviations from the recognised norms of the sovereign states’ system 
are explained by taking Counter Reformation movements and their modern interactions 
into account. If the assumption that thought is constitutive of practise holds, state 
sovereignty can be understood as an institutionalised expression of specific cognitive 
scripts, a social construction, or to say the least, sovereignty is because we invented it 
(Philpott, 2001: 97-110). Philpott exposes the temporal and ideational features of this 
invention in his discussion of the protestant roots of Westphalia. 
 
Reformation ideologies secured sovereignty for the state. Such ideas are a form of social 
power that underlie and are manifest in more visible instruments of power. In the case of 
Westphalia, the social power embodied in the Reformation and manifest in the interest of 
publics, armies, leaders, and states, fuelled the usurpation of Holy Roman authority by an 
atomized system of sovereign states. 
 
 
Global citizenship, on the other hand, has brought the concept and place of state 
sovereignty to the mainstream of current international relations scholarship (Kamau, 
2006:1). Theorists have argued that as long as sovereignty remains clearly defined in the 
context of a political community or entity, the institution of the state as we know it will 
continue to prosper without change. This school is however contrasted by that, which 
believes that global citizenship will make state sovereignty pale into insignificance in the 
light of advances in technology, education, increasing mobility which will ultimately 
engender modernity or globalism (Kamau, 2006:2). 
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As the evolution of the concept of state sovereignty progresses, it is pertinent to examine 
the concept first. Sovereignty literally means independence or autonomy or a community 
free from external control. For Philpott (2001:16), it means the supreme authority within 
a territory. This definition refers to the political leadership within an autonomous state 
that takes decision for the state without recourse to external instructions or script. Here, 
the leadership is the sovereign as it exercises authority over a nation or a people. The 
state is thus having the features of a territory, legitimate authority and a people. 
 
In agreement with the view above, Heller (1996) describes sovereign as the externally 
and internally autonomous limit of authority maintaining its effectiveness with its own 
means of power, “of which the security and personnel are clearly circumscribed.” This 
conventional level of understanding of sovereignty in modern international politics has 
been the cause of the confusion in the international system between nationalism and 
supranationalism; national interest and international law; and raises the question of limits 
of interference of other states or international organisations in a nation encountering 
internal strife like Sudan, Somalia, Rwanda, Kosovo, etc. It is also this critical conflict of 
bounds of state sovereignty that reinforces argument of Masters (1993) that the 
“international system” is anarchic and futile.  
 
For exponents of power politics, or political realism, including Carr, Morgenthau, 
Neibhur, etc, states are ontological givens and sovereignty is a natural phenomenon in 
either an a priori or derivative sense. Sovereign states are logically expressions of an 
international order that is organised by separate groups of peoples with particular 
interests and ideologies. Sovereignty allows for the free aggregation and 
institutionalisation of these interests without the limitation of coercive opposition from 
external sources. The sovereign state thus works towards bordering its interests vis-à-vis 
other actors with the primary concern of survival characterising its behaviour (Dusen, 
2003: 3) 
 
One area where idealists and realists seem to agree, though with separate levels of 
understanding, is the impracticability of absolute state sovereignty. For the realist, as 
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power politics galvanises national interest, a state may resort to invading and usurping the 
sovereignty of other states; just as states compromise sovereignty at times to realise an 
objective of national economic development or development of military power. States 
allow foreign investors in form of transnational and multinational companies and go into 
military treaties and alliances for security. As long as survival and preservation remain 
states’ objectives, the end justifies the means, even if it is giving away part of its 
sovereignty. For the idealists, state sovereignty is automatically limited by membership 
of international organisations, bilateral and multilateral agreements and arrangements, 
and of course, by international law and moral codes on behaviour (Ojo and Sesay, 2001; 
Oppenheim, 1962; Kaplan and Katzenback, 1976). It is thus arguable that state 
sovereignty brings one thing to the fore namely, reconciling what is observable and what 
is possible. 
 
To this end therefore, it is pertinent to settle with the neutral view of Dusen (2001: 4-7) 
that the international system can be better understood when the ontology of the 
determinants of behaviour goes beyond the narrowly defined national interests. For 
liberal theorists like Lomasky (2001: 7) the individual retains ontological significance at 
the international level and boundaries are thought of in terms of the permeability. The 
territoriality of sovereignty can limit the designs of ontologically significant individuals. 
Also critical theorists view sovereignty as a tool of the capitalist for disaggregating 
proletarian movements. For both however, the permeability of sovereign states vis-à-vis 
their territoriality and interests is both achievable, and interests are both achievable and 
empirically observable (Dusen, 2006: 4). 
 
Globalism, beginning with cosmopolitan and universality traditions such as the 
Kantian/deontological school stresses the immateriality of boundaries, the equal moral 
value of persons and indeed attributes moral personhood to the state. The sovereign state 
thus has the same duty to the realisation of universal values as the individual. For Kant 
(Donaldson, 1992: 145-149) state sovereignty is not an intermediate expression of shared 
values and pursuits that lies somewhere between the individual and the global. 
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What we are saying is that the social power of ideas was instrumental in the rise of state 
sovereignty at Westphalia. Philpott (2006b:11) however, argues that such ideas require 
ethical space in which to grow and build momentum. As is true of ideas, the ethical 
constructs that have given rise to sovereign states are discernable and have their own 
genealogies. Tracing this genealogy back to its origins, both human and metaphysical 
helps complete the picture of the evolution of state sovereignty.  
 
To put all the above differently, the Treaty of Westphalia of 1648 that ended the Thirty 
Years War following a challenge by vassals to the overlordship of the Holy Roman 
Empire, ended the absolute sovereignty of Rome over most of Europe, but also created 
several other autonomous units free of Rome. The war and treaty completed an age-long 
question of the moral grounds the Empire had to control the destinies of other states. 
Following this development, the emergent new sovereign states were bound by law and 
morality to honour mutually their independence and relate as equal states. 
 
Although events in the 19th century, particularly the emergence and reign of Napoleon 
Bonaparte were to alter the new political arrangements in Europe, the continent from 
Westphalia, had come to live with the new ideas of state sovereignty in which multiple 
states bound by ethics and legal codes would respect one another’s sovereignty as against 
the old system which had many nations cowed under one suzerainty. Moreover, the 
Treaty of 1648 laid the foundation for an international platform or forum at which states 
could redress issues of interest, cooperation and conflict. The following centuries 
produced improved examples of international organisations, including the Concert of 
Europe, Bismarck’s Congress system, 1899-1907 Hague Conferences, International 
Public Union and the League of Nations- all of which impelled certain compromises of 
sovereign status. 
 
Contemporary international system, characterized by increased interdependence of states 
increased role of global and regional organisations, institutionalization of the collective 
security system, emergence of a New World Order, New International Economic Order, 
globalization, escalated internal struggles by ethnic groups for autonomy, etc, has 
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evolved an even different concept of state sovereignty. Nations can no longer take 
unilateral actions even in matters considered to be overwhelmingly internal. Conventions 
on War or conduct of Hostilities, Human Rights and Humanitarian Laws, among others, 
which have been signed by nations to which they are bound, continually deter states, 
sovereigns, governments, or groups to act irrationally and whoever violates such laws is 
deemed to be committing war crimes. (Jackson 1990, Gasser, 1993, George, 1999). 
 
The Darfur Crisis 
Sudan has been embroiled in ethno-religious and political conflicts that claimed 
thousands of lives and stifled economic development since 1956 (Sanderson, 1963). 
However, the last three decades witnessed, what has been described as the worst 
humanitarian crisis in contemporary world (Youngs, 2004:1). An estimated 800,000 
people or more have been killed in acts described as genocide between 2003 and 2006 
and about 2 million civilians have been displaced from their homes. There had been 
conflict between the rebel Sudan Peoples Liberation Movement(SPLM), Sudan Peoples 
Liberation Army (SPLA) on the one side, and the Sudanese Government and the 
government-backed notorious Janjaweed militia on the other. The old crisis between the 
rebel groups and government on the one hand had a headway when they reached a truce. 
However, as the socio-political heat in Sudan subsided, fresh tension brewed in Western 
Darfur where the population is uniformly Muslim, but has 30 ethnic groups that are either 
Arab or African. 
 
The Darfur crisis in Sudan is particularly turbulent and has been described as the worst 
humanitarian crisis since the Rwandan genocide(O’Fahey, 2004: 4). Arabic elements in 
Darfur are mostly nomads who inhabit the north and south of the region. The centre is 
inhabited by African sedentary farmers drawn from the three principal ethnic groups 
namely, the Fur, Zaghawa, and Massaleit or “Black Africans” (O’Fahey, 2004:5-7). 
Interestingly, much of racial or ethnic distinction had been obliterated by decades of 
interracial marriages and economically and socially motivated movements. From 1983 
however, racial sentiments had considerably decimated the region, with a sharp 
distinction between the “Arab” and “Black” or Zurq (IRIN, 2004). 
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It is pertinent to note that the recourse to racial distinction and acrimonious 
discrimination from 1983 to date was prompted by economic and political 
marginalization, tension over land, hunger, scarcity of farmlands and water resources, 
with resultant severe drought, famine and disease. These depravations, created a social 
milieu of frustration, anger and aggression, which only exploded as a result of political 
manipulations and hegemony by the Arabs over the Africans. For instance, the 
administrative boundary changes imposed by the predominantly Arab regime in 
Khartoum served to alienate the farming tribes, as did the government backing for the 
loose collection of Janjaweed nomadic militias, which have come to comprise several 
thousand fighters of mainly Arab extraction (Youngs, 2004:8). 
 
By 2003, the black population had responded by organising themselves into two rebel 
groups namely, the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) and the Justice and Equality 
Movement (JEM), citing concerns that Darfur would lose out politically and 
economically in the division of power and oil revenue between Khartoum and the South 
in the event of a settlement in the broader civil war. According to the International Crisis 
Group based in Brussels, Germany:              
       The peace talks between the government and the SPLM/A 
       provided the immediate trigger since the Darfur groups 
      feared they would have little leverage after a North/South 
      deal was concluded (ICG, 2004). 
The Sudanese government is far from being a neutral party and conciliator in the Darfur 
rebellion. Snyder (2004) argues that the Darfur rebellion is considered by the government 
as a greater threat than the activities of the SPLM/A in the south, as the SPLM/A is just a 
socio-political movement that had never threatened the north militarily. However, support 
for the Darfur groups JEM and SLM comes from the Muslim population within who had 
a military pedigree. For instance, Turabi, an old ally of President Al-Bashir up to 1999 is 
also a radical Muslim cleric linked to JEM. Again Darfur has contributed over 50% to the 
Sudanese military personnel. The aforementioned factors, coupled with the proximity of 
that region to the capital (Khartoum) are considered ominous for the Sudanese 
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government: a successful insurgency in Darfur would not only fuel insurgencies 
elsewhere, but probably bring down the government and pummel the corporateness of 
Sudan. 
 
We must make an attempt at this juncture to quickly locate the roots of the North-South 
rifts and the general class and ethnic cleavages that had etched into the fabrics of the 
country and caused much interregnum. The crisis can be traced to the incidence of 
colonialism, which, according to Pogoson (2006: 44) effectively bequeathed a legacy of 
northern elite domination over the South and the “islamisation” policy resisted by the 
Southern Christians in its war against the North from independence in 1956, conflict 
between the Arab Muslim North and the black African and predominantly Christian and 
animist South. It is however probably more than a North-South or Arab-African conflict 
if, like Phillips (1995) observes, we take into cognisance 
           the complexities of a war fought by multiethnic groups 
                   where religious differences colour struggles over access 
                   to land or political power. 
The Darfur crisis cannot be fully comprehended without locating it in the general social-
ethnic and religious crisis that had plagued Sudan since independence, and it can be 
argued that the Darfur case is even a continuation of the Sudanese nationality and identity 
question. With about twenty-eight million people, over four hundred languages, Sudan is 
unique for being the geographical link between the Arab world and autochthonous Africa 
with a blend of moderate Muslims and Christians. However, with the continuous hold on 
to power by the Islamic North, crisis brewed from the predominantly Christian or animist 
South which sought power in Khartoum. The Centre and South, comprising numerous 
African ethnic groups detested the rule of General Omar Al-Bashir of the National 
Islamic Front (NIF) which had placed Islam ahead of other religions in the running of 
state affairs. Soon, the South, particularly the Dinka group, put up an organised 
movement (the SPLM-A) to challenge the North, until a peace talk brokered between the 
North and South triggered off fear, anxiety and rebellion in Darfur which does not want 
to lose out in the power calculus if the North  and South close ranks (Youngs, 2004: 7). 
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Aside the ethnic, religious and political dimensions to the war, economic interests also 
feature pillage, land expropriation; trade monopolies, protection money and diversion of 
relief aid transformed the war between the government and the two rebel groups into an 
instrument of enterprise (Pogoson, 2006:44-45). The government carries out large-scale 
violence through the Janjaweed in order to create a conducive atmosphere for continued 
monopolization of Southern lands for the Arab nomads and the exploitation of the oil in 
the South. As such, armed conflict is profitable for government and the rebels. This 
development is reminiscent of the government-backed Hutu Interahamwes in Rwanda 
through which the Tutsis were massively slaughtered and government and militia leaders 
became war economy profiteers. 
 
The Darfur crisis has led to a death toll of over half a million so far, displacements of 
more than 2 million and general fear, anxiety, insecurity, disruptions, suffering, hunger 
and diseases (Pogoson, 2006: 44). It has thus wrought humanitarian crisis that is arguably 
unprecedented secondary only to the 1994 Rwandan crisis. As the humanitarian crisis 
rages in Darfur and the entire Sudan, the attendant famine and starvation attracting relief 
aid from outside have boosted the war economy. Rebels and government agents hijack 
the relief commodities which they sell at prohibitive costs and fortunes are made through 
the “black market” contracts for transportation, money changing, security, and other 
services provided to international aid organisations (Pogoson, 2006:45). 
 
However, the long suffering masses, the huge other humanitarian problems and the 
proliferation of small arms, which engendered worse social insecurity, have also attracted 
international concern and sympathies. Among such concerns is that coming from the UN 
and AU, who  indicated strong interests to maintain peace monitoring troops and resolve 
the conflict. But the Sudanese government raised strong objection to this, claiming that 
the Darfur issue is just one of the infinitesimal domestic crises that could be settled 
locally. This has raised the issue of whether the government can invoke the right of state 
sovereignty and insulate itself from global influence in a matter that has gone beyond its 
capacity by virtue of its humanitarian implications. 
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UN Intervention in Darfur 
The huge humanitarian crisis resulting from the conflict, gross violations of human rights 
and international humanitarian laws and laws of conflict, the degeneration into genocide, 
and the complicity of government in the matter which heightened the conflict, 
externalised the Darfur crisis and brought the question of Sudanese sovereignty to 
question. It is noteworthy that the United Nations takes the issue of humanitarianism very 
seriously. Indeed, by the close of the 20th century, the international community reviewed 
its traditional prohibition against military intervention in a fundamental way. 
 
Against the backdrop of the changing nature of conflicts and wars and penetration of 
atrocities by governments against their own citizens like in Cambodia, Haiti, former 
Yugoslavia, Liberia, Rwanda, Somalia, Afghanistan, Iraq and Congo-Kinshasa (under 
Mobutu) to mention a few, the global community declared the right to prompt 
intervention with armed troops. This is borne by new rational thinking that governments 
have a right and obligation to intervene in the affairs of other states, and that victims of 
armed conflicts must remain under the protection of the principles of humanity and 
dictates of public conscience (Pogoson, 2006:41; Smith, 2004) 
 
The UN Security Council delayed like in the case of Rwanda in 1994, in giving any 
meaningful consideration to Darfur. Meanwhile, the UN launched the Greater Darfur 
Special Initiative to raise the sum of $23million in September 2003, which was followed 
by the warning in November by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian 
Affairs (UN-OCHA) that Darfur was already on the path of constituting a major world 
humanitarian concern. In December 2003, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, also called 
the world’s attention to the potential combustion in Sudan’s Darfur, which prompted the 
UN fact-finding missions to the place in 2004. In July 2004 the Security Council adopted 
Resolution 1556 on Darfur advocating the following: 
 
1. Permission of humanitarian access by the feuding parties 
2. Cooperation with effects towards mediation 
3. Respect for all ceasefire agreements 
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4. Disarming the Janjaweed by the government  
5. Bringing of the Janjaweed leaders to justice 
 
The resolution allowed a thirty day period for the implementation of all the demands to 
be followed up by monthly updates to be forwarded to the Security Council. It is 
pertinent to note however, that the UN did not speak with one voice over the 
implementation of this resolution as different states expressed different opinions over it, 
thus being divided over intervention in Darfur. This was probably as a result of power 
politics and self-interest particularly in respect of Sudan’s oil. As Pogoson (2006:46) 
notes, oil fuelled the conflict in the first place, and has been a major stimulant for peace 
at the same time. While the US, Britain and Norway want to retain the control of the CPA 
peace process, the UN as a body was even undecided as to the extent of implementing the 
Resolution on Darfur (Reeves, 2006). 
 
China and Pakistan abstained in the resolution; Russia and Algeria supported it but asked 
for more time for the Sudanese government. On the second resolution, the four countries 
abstained on the grounds that the sanctions were inappropriate and as a sign of 
disapproval of the hard stance towards the Sudanese government as contained in the 
Second Resolution (Rice, 2006). 
 
These developments caused three things. First, the UN role in Sudan became 
circumscribed. Second, the UN was largely excluded from investment in the peace 
process as it also delayed in taking any meaningful steps. Third, as a result of lack of 
cohesion in the Security Council and threat of veto by Russia and China, the resolution 
ended up failing to specify the appropriate measures against non-compliance and made 
only a few demands of the Sudanese government (UN, 2004) 
 
There is no doubt that the early UN measures in Sudan were contributory to the 
escalation. As a result of divergent interests of individual states, the Security Council 
could not act effectively; it had neither concrete evidence incriminating the government 
of supporting the cantankerous Janjaweed, nor a time-table for its disarming, nor the 
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means to back the resolutions up. Hence, the Janjaweed grew in strength and viciousness 
and the government commenced a campaign which earned some international support, to 
end UN and AU’s presence or intervention in the Darfur crisis. This demand was backed 
in May 2004 and in July September 2006 by the hype that the crisis was too insignificant 
to attract international attention and that Sudanese authorities were capable of arresting 
the situation. To this end, the government placed severe obstructions in the way of 
humanitarian and other agencies access to Darfur (Haass, 2003; ICG, 2006:3). 
 
Apparently, the international community is failing in its mission in Darfur. As at 2005, 
the AU presence in terms of troops was less than 7,000 and the civilian protection was 
near zero (ICG, 2005:1). However, while the UN and international non-governmental 
organisations (INGOs) have taken the lead in responding to growing humanitarian needs 
and authorising accountability measures against those responsible for activities, the AU 
has the lead for reaching a political solution to the conflict and monitoring the 
humanitarian and cease-fire agreements. The AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS) has had a 
positive impact on security in some areas by often going beyond the strict terms of its 
mandate, but its ability to protect civilians and humanitarian operations is impeded by 
limited capacity, insufficient resources and political constraints (ICG 2005:1) 
 
In January 2005, the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur issued its report to 
the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, assigning responsibility for massive human rights 
abuse against civilians to the government of Sudan and its allies, concluding that  
 
It is undeniable that mass killing occurred in Darfur and 
 that the killings were penetrated by the government forces 
 and the Janjaweed in a climate of total impunity and even 
 encouragement to commit serious crimes against a portion 
 of the civilian population (US Holocaust Memorial Museum, 
 2006:3). 
The Commission did not really find immediate evidence against the government of 
perpetrating or aiding acts of genocide, government officials were however deemed 
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culpable of genocide intents. Following this suspicion and the other discoveries, the UN 
Security Council passed more resolutions to stop violence. On March 31, 2006, they 
voted with the US abstaining, to refer the situation in Darfur to the prosecutor of the 
International Criminal Court (Ibid). 
 
The precarious situation by February 2006, prompted President Bush to call for the 
doubling of the number of international troops and for a bigger role for the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organisation (NATO) in the peacekeeping efforts. Bush’s advocacy, coupled with 
the alarm by Jan Egeland, the UN Coordinator for Humanitarian Affairs that the crisis 
was worsening and indeed the inability of the AU force (already witnessing a 900% 
increase in attacks against it) to contain the situation, prompted the UN Security Council 
resolution on August 31, 2006 authorizing the deployment of UN peacekeepers to Darfur 
(US HMM, 2006:2). 
 
However, the Sudanese government, from the moment of the passage of that UN Security 
Council resolution for a multinational force in Darfur has been so uncooperative and 
continues to vehemently reject the possibility of a multinational deployment. The 
government even worsened the situation when it challenged the AU about its continued 
relevance in the advent of the UN forces present in Darfur. It stressed that the AU would 
have to leave Darfur if it insisted on handing over its mission to the UN on September 30, 
2006 (Ibid). 
 
What appears a breakthrough was however realised on Friday November 17 2006 when a 
newly proposed hybrid/ interim force emerged out of discussions with AU, Arab League 
and African officials in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. The agreement paved the way for a joint 
AU/UN peacekeeping force for Darfur composed primarily and led by Africans and 
funded by the UN. The effectiveness of the force would depend on troop size, command 
structure and mandate if it must be effective. While the UN advocates a 17,000 large 
troops with 3,000 police from Africa under UN control structure, the Sudanese 
government claims that only 12,000 troops will be enough, stressing that only the AU 
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would be allowed some international logistics support in Darfur, while it would not 
accept UN command of the force (www.yahoonews.ca ,2006). 
 
The UN intervention in Sudan was reluctantly permitted by the Sudanese government 
after much international pressure. Among such pressure was the May 15 2005 rally at 
Downing Street and the Sudanese Embassy in England organised by the Aegis Trust’s 
ProtectDarfur Campaign made up of genocide survivors from Darfur, Rwanda, Bosnia 
and the Holocaust. The protest was to call on the government of Sudan to use its position 
at the UN to secure a mandate for peace enforcement in Darfur and to further empower 
the AU in the area of civilian protection against genocide. There was a more proactive 
step on October 20, 2006 as 120 survivors from the Holocaust and genocides in 
Cambodia, Rwanda and Bosnia called on European leaders to impose sanctions on the 
Sudanese government to stop the conflict in Darfur. The genocide survivors signed an 
open letter to key European governments ahead of the EU informal Heads of State 
meeting in Finland (Aegis Trust, 2006:1). 
 
The Sudanese government rejected the UN forces because it desired “justice” only from 
diplomatic and political means and not by military means at the instance of the UN. Also, 
the government blamed the Zionists and Israel for the crisis and believed that the UN was 
an appendage of the former, which it described as an invading force. The Sudanese 
President particularly stressed that the international community had no business in an 
exclusively internal matter, claiming that Sudan had a sovereignty that made it illegal for 
the UN to interfere in its domestic affairs (Barillas, 2006; news.scotman.com)  
 
 
Also, the US government and the UN had, from June 2006, come under heavy attacks to 
stop their rhetorics over Darfur and take decisive steps. To this end, between June 29 and 
30, US Secretary of State and UN’s Annan visited Khartoum respectively with the intent 
to prevail on Khartoum to reverse the ethnic cleansing and humanitarian catastrophe in 
Darfur. The Democrat opposition in the US joined the human rights groups by 
demanding the “strong, sustained leadership from the US” in the crisis, asking the 
 16 
Secretary of State Powell to make it clear to Sudanese officials that the US expected 
Sudan’s complete cooperation in ending the killing and facilitating the delivery of relief 
supplies (Afrol News, 2006:1) 
 
The suspicion of Sudanese complicity in the crisis is informed by a number of factors: 
lack of concrete actions taken by the authorities to stop or neutralise the Janjaweed; the 
selective way the government is handling rebellious groups, such as its warmness 
towards the Southern rebels and the Janjaweed while; stoppage of emergency aid from 
reaching the victims through covert bureaucratized procedure, and the insistence by the 
government that the Darfur problem was “not critical enough” to attract international 
intervention. 
 
Has Sudan a Veto? 
One pertinent matter arising from the Sudanese government’s recalcitrance over external 
intervention in the Darfur crisis is the old question earlier asked about the limits of the 
exercise of state sovereignty in the contemporary international system. Has Sudan a veto 
to stop the UN, AU and international community in the Darfur crisis? 
 
Sudan, on the grounds of principle of non-interference, has consistently maintained that 
the Sudanese (Darfur) crisis is a purely internal matter over which the government alone 
has power to deal with. It also claimed that the escalated crisis was wholly an African 
problem that required only African solution, which Sudan could provide. However, as 
Sudan came under heavy pressure from the international community to check the 
degeneration of the crisis to humanitarian catastrophe, the authorities has not been able to 
arrest the situation unilaterally, thus reinforcing the argument that grave issues as 
genocide require concerted efforts from the international system. 
 
Sudan has adopted force at times to limit external interference. For instance, in May 
2005, the government arrested and detained Paul Foreman, Head of the Dutch wing of the 
humanitarian-based Medicines Sans Frontiers (MSF). His arrest occurred after the MSF 
issued a report on rape in Darfur. He was subsequently charged for crimes against the 
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State. He was ordered not to leave the country until pressure was mounted for him to be 
released on bail (Aegis Trust, 2006:5). The arrest and trial of Foreman have been 
described as attempts by the Sudanese government to frustrate external interference and 
discourage international aid workers. Other attempts included the reported  diversion of 
relief materials by government forces and the permission of  Janjaweed militia to carry on 
with their acts of seizure, looting, pillage and diversion of the goods from which both the 
government officials and militia profited. 
 
Sometime in June 2006, Sudan suspended the work of all the UN missions in Darfur 
except that of the World Food Programme and UNICEF after alleging that a rebel leader, 
Adam Jamous of the SLA flew aboard a UN aircraft, thus insinuating that the rebels were 
enjoying UN protection. Sudan demanded an explanation from the UN for the action, 
claiming that: 
          The authorities were not consulted, no permission 
          was asked for and It was clear negligence… a 
          flagrant violation of Sudan’s sovereignty (Rice, 2006:1). 
In a similar manner, shortly after the November 17, 2006 agreement in Addis Ababa on 
an AU/UN military arrangement for Darfur, the Sudanese government promptly 
dismissed the possibility of a UN-commanded force, or control of what it calls the “blue 
helmets”. According to Abdulmohamoud Abdulhaleem, the Sudanese envoy to the UN, 
the November 17 accord represents 
         a new plan that can be largely accepted by Sudan  
         and takes 1706 to the graveyard (US HMM, 2006:1). 
“1706” was an obvious reference to Resolution 1706 of the UN Security Council. The 
resolution had in September authorized the setting up of the UN force. In the new 
arrangement, he believed there would be a “special type of operation” in which the UN 
would be “paying for the AU to do the job” (Rice, 2006:1) and there would no longer be 
need for the enforcement of a UN resolution to intervene. 
 
Although the Sudanese government can use covert means to try to frustrate UN and the 
international community’s efforts in Darfur to preserve its “autonomy”, there are 
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adequate mechanisms that can stop Sudan, like any other state from creating artificial 
insulation in modern international system. The Sudanese government cannot not stop a 
UN force in Darfur if the UN acts under Chapter 7 of its Charter. It cannot also prevent a 
multinational intervention if one is mounted either with or without UN authorization.. 
The reasons are not far from prognosis. First, the Sudanese authorities belong to the UN, 
an organisation to which nations, by membership, have surrendered some degree of their 
sovereignty. The Charter of the UN clearly states that, if 
the Security Council deems that the continuance of dispute 
is in fact likely to endanger the maintenance of international 
  peace and security, it shall decide whether to take action under  
article 36 or to recommend such terms of settlement as it may 
consider appropriate (Chapter VI, Article 37:2). 
Article 36:1 of Chapter VI grants the UN Security Council the leeway to settle dispute in 
a manner appropriate and make recommendations. Also, unlike what Sudan considered 
victory over “blue helmets” and for AU- controlled UN-AU military efforts, the Charter’s 
under Article 53:1 states that all regional arrangements in conflict-ridden areas can only 
be subservient to and authorized by the UNSC (also, see UN Security Council Press 
Release, 25 May 2004 and Alvarez, 2005). Hence, the agreement to have AU lead the 
joint efforts is probably informed by the need to avoid a direct confrontation with 
Khartoum, which may escalate violence. 
 
The existence of international legal standards, arising from treaties, conventions, 
protocols, accords, covenants, etc, by which state signatories are bound as “equal 
sovereigns” impede (positively) state sovereignty for the purpose of checking state 
excesses and overstretching of state sovereignty. Truly, international law may reflect the 
lack of international sovereign and thus be enforced only through reciprocity and consent 
(Starke, 1963; Couloumbis, 1996), the presence of rules guiding war, treatment of 
combatants and non-combatants, prisoners of war, genocide, war crimes, human rights, 
etc are binding on all contractual partners or member-states (pacta sunt servanda). There 
are rules governing such domestic crises that may escalate into an international security 
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issue as ethnic violence and genocide, which are no longer exclusively internal but are 
matters of international security and humanitarian concern. 
 
International humanitarian law  and human rights laws complement the foregoing as it 
was instituted to protect human beings and safeguard the dignity of man in war or 
conflict situations (Kaplan & Katzenback, 1976, Onigbinde, 1996). For humanitarian 
reasons, international humanitarian law limits the right of the parties to a conflict to use 
methods and means of warfare of their choice and seek to protect persons and property 
that are, or may be affected by the conflict (George, 1999; Hobsbawn, 1990; Gasser, 
1993:16). The four Geneva conventions of 1949 and the additional protocols of 1977 
were major breakthroughs in humanitarian law, namely the code of human rights 
applicable to people involved in or affected by armed conflict, internal or international. 
That is why in the cases of Iraq, Bosnia, Rwanda and Cambodia, the international 
community had to act.  
 
The fact is that most nations, including Sudan, are bound by these conventions and 
protocols as sovereign states within the UN which they freely joined. International 
humanitarian law, according to Pogoson (2006:37) revolve round the principle of 
chivalry, which denounces and forbids resort to dishonourable means of conduct of 
hostilities, and implies forbearance and need for belligerents to be fair in both offence 
and defence. When these are not demonstrated, states become culpable and may become 
targets of sanctions or collective security measures for peace enforcement or 
peacekeeping such as in Sudan. 
 
Sudan therefore has no veto in a matter that clearly constitutes regional and global 
security threat and enormous humanitarian concern. The statutes and international 
practice are not on the side of the Sudanese government. They clearly demonstrate that 
no state enjoys unbridled sovereignty when domestic issues have got out of hand. 
 
Sudan’s government is not arresting the ugly situation which has degenerated almost to 
the level of 1994 Rwanda, nor is it, at best, creating a level playing field. The Sudan 
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crisis has thus, become regional in all respects: African, Arab and Middle East contexts. 
The state of Sudan is on the precipice. Unless the government joins hands with the 
peacekeepers and stop protecting the Janjaweed militia, the “cleansing” of the Black 
Christians and moderate Muslims, the humanitarian and social crises may become 
catastrophic. 
 
Conclusion 
It has been established that the exercise of absolute sovereignty by a state is no longer 
tenable in 21st century global system of states. The reasons have been elucidated. Issues 
of human rights, humanitarian crisis are  no longer accepted as purely domestic and 
therefore not covered by limitations of the principle of non-interference in the internal 
affairs of states. Sudan has international legal commitments as a member of several 
international organizations and because it is signatory to many international conventions 
and protocols on human rights, humanitarian issues and conduct of war and hostilities, 
which are quintessentially binding on it, its exercise of absolute sovereignty is limited.. 
Also, international enlightened public opinion is not on the side of the Sudan’s claim of 
right to “absolute sovereignty” it hinges on to stop UN intervention. Already, leaders of 
African and Arab nations, two regions to which Sudan has bond, are supportive of UN 
troops’ presence in Darfur. 
 
However, the issue goes beyond Sudan and its reluctance to accommodate UN 
peacekeeping troops. The main issue is UN’s slow, indecisive and uncommitted approach 
to settling the Darfur crisis, which is reminiscent of its disposition towards previous 
similar crises in Africa like in Rwanda, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Burundi. What appears 
absent on the part of the UN is political will. Boosted by a political will and a 
determination to get rid of socialism in East and Central Europe, the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO) neither waited for the UN nor the European Community 
before it intervened in the grave social and ethnic crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The 
aftermath of the NATO intervention was the UN’s active engagement and a post-conflict 
management led by Clinton’s United States, that included the division of Bosnia into 
three ethnically pure mini states (Harris, 1996). NATO, led by the US, neither foot-
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dragged in intervention nor did the UN accord any importance to Bosnian Moslem threats 
against intervention.  
The case of Sudan should not be different. If it is a mere peacekeeping matter, then 
consent of Sudan may be sought by the UN. But where it is a question of huge social 
crisis, genocide and humanitarian crisis like in Darfur, what is required is political will. 
Any situation that threatens regional peace and security like that of Darfur, deserves 
urgent intervention by the international community as clearly spelt out in the UN Charter. 
UN’s lack of will in African crises is recurrent and several, and it betrays what appears to 
be lack of concern about African problems. This has generated questions like whether the 
black world really matters to the international community dominated by the whites and 
whether the African life means much to the rest of the world, or whether the UN is indeed 
a level-playing field for all races of the world. 
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